Sunday, February 26, 2006
Fives...the report.
Well, that's another tournament over. I was unfortunate to draw a top ten player in the first round. And that was pretty much the end of that. I was lucky to get a few points off him, although I didn't really play my best. Never mind, there is always next year, and the year after that, and the year after that......
Saturday, February 25, 2006
Fives...
This weekend I'm competing in the North of England Open Rugby Fives Tournament (hosted this year by my university so I don't have to go anywhere, hooray) which promises to be an exhausting yet enjoyable couple of days. Of course, it could probably be better spent writing a summative essay on Ethics & Values. If I actually get anywhere in the competition I'll stick it up on here....don't hold your breath....
Quantum computer solves problem, without running...
Well, this is bizarre in the extreme. Quantum mechanics/theory never ceases to amaze.
"I think I can safely say that no one understands quantum mechanics." Richard Feynmann
Never has this appeared more appropriate a comment. For a computation to provide an answer prior to/without actually taking place seems to be counter-intuitive in the extreme. However, our intuitions are bred out of experience of the macroscopic, classical, world of cause and effect. Interactions and 'events' (if we may call them such) at a quantum level are something else entirely. Quantum theory deals in probabilities rather than 'definite' predictions or observations for, in a sense, anything and everything can and does happen in this world. Furthermore, as a result of Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle (or, rather, as the principle describes) one can never know both the position and the momentum of a particle at any one time. Thus, there is a 'fuzziness' inherent within quantum theory. It is this fuzziness of state, alongside the very much related concept of wave-particle duality (and here), which makes the above computation possible. I don't propose to explore the mechanics of the process further (because I'm a layman...and can't), rather I intend to explore some of the initial philosophical implications as they occur to me.
Clearly the possibility of obtaining a solution without running a program has ramifications. Most obviously concerning the nature of truth. A full discussion would leave me without enough time to actually do a degree. I will therefore give a brief treatment:
Observation & Truth
What do we consider 'truth' to be? If, for the sake of this discussion, we define truth as the accurate reflection of a state-of-affairs, I.e. as the 'fact of the matter', we can continue in a discussion of physical verisimilitude. (I am aware that this is not a wholly satisfactory definition of truth, by any means. However, for our purposes, (a discussion of implications) it will serve).
In what way has a state-of-affairs been established in this event? Can we truly say that a photonic non-investigation of probabilistic phase space has established anything? Well, the question is more concerned with whether our concepts of truth, derived from observation, can truly be applied to the microscopic and thus whether anything meaningful can come from such quantum interactions. Scientific minds are unsure as to the meaning of our models of the quantum world as it is. Can we, from such models, derive a truth the foundation of which we are at a loss to understand? 'Quantum conjecture' might be a better answer than 'solution'. I am not disputing in any way the value of such work or the inference-based techniques utilised. What I am asking is whether we should rethink our model of meaning, fact, in the light of it.
If one can obtain a solution by inference from a theoretical non-event as a result of quantum superposition does one then accept a model of truth derived from probabilities, phase-space, rather than concrete value. Do we lose absolute truth on such a model? I don't propose to answer this, I'm still thinking it through myself. What I do propose is that it is a live issue. Truth as 'the way of things' does not seem to cover what we have here.
Right, now I'm going to bed...
"I think I can safely say that no one understands quantum mechanics." Richard Feynmann
Never has this appeared more appropriate a comment. For a computation to provide an answer prior to/without actually taking place seems to be counter-intuitive in the extreme. However, our intuitions are bred out of experience of the macroscopic, classical, world of cause and effect. Interactions and 'events' (if we may call them such) at a quantum level are something else entirely. Quantum theory deals in probabilities rather than 'definite' predictions or observations for, in a sense, anything and everything can and does happen in this world. Furthermore, as a result of Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle (or, rather, as the principle describes) one can never know both the position and the momentum of a particle at any one time. Thus, there is a 'fuzziness' inherent within quantum theory. It is this fuzziness of state, alongside the very much related concept of wave-particle duality (and here), which makes the above computation possible. I don't propose to explore the mechanics of the process further (because I'm a layman...and can't), rather I intend to explore some of the initial philosophical implications as they occur to me.
Clearly the possibility of obtaining a solution without running a program has ramifications. Most obviously concerning the nature of truth. A full discussion would leave me without enough time to actually do a degree. I will therefore give a brief treatment:
Observation & Truth
What do we consider 'truth' to be? If, for the sake of this discussion, we define truth as the accurate reflection of a state-of-affairs, I.e. as the 'fact of the matter', we can continue in a discussion of physical verisimilitude. (I am aware that this is not a wholly satisfactory definition of truth, by any means. However, for our purposes, (a discussion of implications) it will serve).
In what way has a state-of-affairs been established in this event? Can we truly say that a photonic non-investigation of probabilistic phase space has established anything? Well, the question is more concerned with whether our concepts of truth, derived from observation, can truly be applied to the microscopic and thus whether anything meaningful can come from such quantum interactions. Scientific minds are unsure as to the meaning of our models of the quantum world as it is. Can we, from such models, derive a truth the foundation of which we are at a loss to understand? 'Quantum conjecture' might be a better answer than 'solution'. I am not disputing in any way the value of such work or the inference-based techniques utilised. What I am asking is whether we should rethink our model of meaning, fact, in the light of it.
If one can obtain a solution by inference from a theoretical non-event as a result of quantum superposition does one then accept a model of truth derived from probabilities, phase-space, rather than concrete value. Do we lose absolute truth on such a model? I don't propose to answer this, I'm still thinking it through myself. What I do propose is that it is a live issue. Truth as 'the way of things' does not seem to cover what we have here.
Right, now I'm going to bed...
© Alan Bowden, 2005
Friday, February 24, 2006
Are there Forms?
The following is a philosophy essay I reeled off in the 30 minutes before deadline....I know, that's distinctly poor time-management. As a result it is essentially a map of an evolving thought in my mind rather than a structured essay. Hopefully it is of interest to someone:
What then are Plato’s Forms (Eidos)? This is far from being an easy question. The Forms are the constituents of a ‘higher’ realm, an unchanging and eternal world of intelligible ‘definitions’ of which our world of ‘Becoming’ is a pale, material, and crude reflection. Objects in this world ‘participate’ in the Forms and it is by virtue of this relation that we come to recognise them as ‘horse’ or ‘man’ etc
Forms exist, not as higher concepts outside of our immediate world, but as common concepts within this world of becoming, of flux. The concept of a separate world populated by immutable objects of cognition is incoherent and superfluous.
In using the same predicate for different things, we do not see in objects some higher thing of which they are only pale reflections; what is actually happening is that an object, for example a chair, is being ascribed to a certain linguistic or conceptual class within the mind of the observer, independent of the chair and derivative of the learning process of the brain from childhood. An object may be called a ‘chair’ if it resembles that which has come to be known as a chair, not through some recollection of perfection, but by virtue of the very fact of the knowledge of the diversity of experience of objects. Labels in themselves are imperfection, not reflections of perfection in which objects participate; for they reflect the inability of man to experience without the classification and requirement of reference to prior understanding or conception. The metaphysics of Plato’s Forms is an attempt to make intelligible the mode of understanding, something which differs in every person.
The true Forms, if that is what we should call them+, are therefore linguistic. In a way similar to the language games of the later Wittgenstein similar predication does not imply commonality in that which is referred to in anything other than accidental qualities, which are then crudely formed into classes by the brain. We call things by the same name simply because they are similar enough for convenient pigeonholing, not because they are instantiations or some higher Form. Nothing is truly similar, except in interpretation, and this itself differs within and between languages.
For example, we take three sentences in three languages:
a) The book is red b) Le livre est rouge, and c) Das Buch ist rot.
Plato’s conception here would be that all three sentences are referring to objects which participate in the Form ‘Book’ and ‘Red’; they in some way, however crudely, are reflecting the eternal and immutable perfection in the higher realm. However, on closer inspection this is problematic.
Firstly, and this may seems a strange question, what is the language of the Forms?
Is it the Form of the Book, or the Die Form des Buches? This highlights a problem for Plato. How are we to understand language in his metaphysical framework? Is there a Form of Language, or a Form of French, English, German, Chinese? Or perhaps there is no Form conforming to language at all; perhaps language is simple the referential system by which the world of becoming is understood, necessary but undesirable compared to the perfection of apprehension of the transcendent Forms. Does language in fact inhibit ascension to the Forms for Plato? This is a good question, for language can be construed as very much a product or association of the body, of the physical rather than the mental, and as such a problem for the philosopher wanting to purify him or herself in order to reach the forms. The crux of the matter is this: is man capable of conception outside of language? That is to say, is all we are capable of thinking that which can be framed in language? If the answer is no, then language must be part of the conception of Forms; if yes, then it is likely that it is this non-linguistic reflection of which Plato would think most highly. I would argue that conception outside of language for modern man is inconceivable. One may detect a certain circularity in that sentence, as well as objecting that emotions are very often non-linguistic, more feelings than concepts. That is to say, one may argue that to speak of conception (not, I emphasise, perception), of the framing of concepts, in the terms of that in which we do the framing is unhelpful. This is, however, the very point we are making. That is all we can do with language, we cannot escape it. To think requires a language of thought. We are talking here in ‘conception’ of labeling, taxonomy. That is what the Theory of Forms is really about; it is a metaphysics of the classification of knowledge with a glaring hole when it comes to the framework of reference: language.
Secondly, and related to our first point, in some languages there are different taxonomies.
In French for example, the GCSE student will (or should) know that there can be not just a livre, but a cahier as well. Here we see differing predicates. Does this mean, then, that there are two forms; one of Cahier and one of Livre, or do we simply have Book of which the two French nouns are simply distortions?
Thirdly, what is it that that the book has in common with the Form of the Book. Surely, in this case, it is necessary to posit a third book in which both the instantiation in this world and, necessarily, the instantiation of the Form of the book, participate. In other words, we find a regression in participation.
This is the Third Man argument, recounted in Aristotle’s Metaphysics (Melling) as well as by Plato himself in Parmenides.
Quite simply, Forms are superfluous; if we apply Occam’s Razor (do not multiply entities unnecessarily) then we can see that the positing of another world of Forms is philosophically untenable for there is less than sufficient reason to do so. If we focus on the language and framework of conception and knowledge then we see that Plato’s confusion of knowledge of something and the object of knowledge (in other words, knowing that something versus the existence of an object of knowledge) is really a confusion about general classes in societal communication; a product of evolution.
Thus are Forms not self-existent in the Platonic sense, nor the population of some metaphysical ‘realm’; rather they are the linguistic classes of different people at different times in different places. Richard Dawkins spoke of memes and indeed they are still much spoken of today, as the all-pervasive concepts of our lives and cultures; as, one might say, the Forms of modern man and his cognition, not just of chairs, tables and colours, but of more abstract and abstruse things such as ‘art’, ‘mind’ and behaviour. Are these the forms by which we truly exist, reflecting not some higher world, but the world in which we are truly grounded and in which our existence truly becomes?
+ It is something I am very dubious of, for the capitalisation alone seems to imply some independent existence, an entity, rather than a commonality of conception and language use.
References
Melling, David, Understanding Plato, Oxford University Press, New York, 1987
Solomon, Robert, Introducing Philosophy, Oxford University Press, New York, 2005
© Alan Bowden, 2005
What then are Plato’s Forms (Eidos)? This is far from being an easy question. The Forms are the constituents of a ‘higher’ realm, an unchanging and eternal world of intelligible ‘definitions’ of which our world of ‘Becoming’ is a pale, material, and crude reflection. Objects in this world ‘participate’ in the Forms and it is by virtue of this relation that we come to recognise them as ‘horse’ or ‘man’ etc
Forms exist, not as higher concepts outside of our immediate world, but as common concepts within this world of becoming, of flux. The concept of a separate world populated by immutable objects of cognition is incoherent and superfluous.
In using the same predicate for different things, we do not see in objects some higher thing of which they are only pale reflections; what is actually happening is that an object, for example a chair, is being ascribed to a certain linguistic or conceptual class within the mind of the observer, independent of the chair and derivative of the learning process of the brain from childhood. An object may be called a ‘chair’ if it resembles that which has come to be known as a chair, not through some recollection of perfection, but by virtue of the very fact of the knowledge of the diversity of experience of objects. Labels in themselves are imperfection, not reflections of perfection in which objects participate; for they reflect the inability of man to experience without the classification and requirement of reference to prior understanding or conception. The metaphysics of Plato’s Forms is an attempt to make intelligible the mode of understanding, something which differs in every person.
The true Forms, if that is what we should call them+, are therefore linguistic. In a way similar to the language games of the later Wittgenstein similar predication does not imply commonality in that which is referred to in anything other than accidental qualities, which are then crudely formed into classes by the brain. We call things by the same name simply because they are similar enough for convenient pigeonholing, not because they are instantiations or some higher Form. Nothing is truly similar, except in interpretation, and this itself differs within and between languages.
For example, we take three sentences in three languages:
a) The book is red b) Le livre est rouge, and c) Das Buch ist rot.
Plato’s conception here would be that all three sentences are referring to objects which participate in the Form ‘Book’ and ‘Red’; they in some way, however crudely, are reflecting the eternal and immutable perfection in the higher realm. However, on closer inspection this is problematic.
Firstly, and this may seems a strange question, what is the language of the Forms?
Is it the Form of the Book, or the Die Form des Buches? This highlights a problem for Plato. How are we to understand language in his metaphysical framework? Is there a Form of Language, or a Form of French, English, German, Chinese? Or perhaps there is no Form conforming to language at all; perhaps language is simple the referential system by which the world of becoming is understood, necessary but undesirable compared to the perfection of apprehension of the transcendent Forms. Does language in fact inhibit ascension to the Forms for Plato? This is a good question, for language can be construed as very much a product or association of the body, of the physical rather than the mental, and as such a problem for the philosopher wanting to purify him or herself in order to reach the forms. The crux of the matter is this: is man capable of conception outside of language? That is to say, is all we are capable of thinking that which can be framed in language? If the answer is no, then language must be part of the conception of Forms; if yes, then it is likely that it is this non-linguistic reflection of which Plato would think most highly. I would argue that conception outside of language for modern man is inconceivable. One may detect a certain circularity in that sentence, as well as objecting that emotions are very often non-linguistic, more feelings than concepts. That is to say, one may argue that to speak of conception (not, I emphasise, perception), of the framing of concepts, in the terms of that in which we do the framing is unhelpful. This is, however, the very point we are making. That is all we can do with language, we cannot escape it. To think requires a language of thought. We are talking here in ‘conception’ of labeling, taxonomy. That is what the Theory of Forms is really about; it is a metaphysics of the classification of knowledge with a glaring hole when it comes to the framework of reference: language.
Secondly, and related to our first point, in some languages there are different taxonomies.
In French for example, the GCSE student will (or should) know that there can be not just a livre, but a cahier as well. Here we see differing predicates. Does this mean, then, that there are two forms; one of Cahier and one of Livre, or do we simply have Book of which the two French nouns are simply distortions?
Thirdly, what is it that that the book has in common with the Form of the Book. Surely, in this case, it is necessary to posit a third book in which both the instantiation in this world and, necessarily, the instantiation of the Form of the book, participate. In other words, we find a regression in participation.
This is the Third Man argument, recounted in Aristotle’s Metaphysics (Melling) as well as by Plato himself in Parmenides.
Quite simply, Forms are superfluous; if we apply Occam’s Razor (do not multiply entities unnecessarily) then we can see that the positing of another world of Forms is philosophically untenable for there is less than sufficient reason to do so. If we focus on the language and framework of conception and knowledge then we see that Plato’s confusion of knowledge of something and the object of knowledge (in other words, knowing that something versus the existence of an object of knowledge) is really a confusion about general classes in societal communication; a product of evolution.
Thus are Forms not self-existent in the Platonic sense, nor the population of some metaphysical ‘realm’; rather they are the linguistic classes of different people at different times in different places. Richard Dawkins spoke of memes and indeed they are still much spoken of today, as the all-pervasive concepts of our lives and cultures; as, one might say, the Forms of modern man and his cognition, not just of chairs, tables and colours, but of more abstract and abstruse things such as ‘art’, ‘mind’ and behaviour. Are these the forms by which we truly exist, reflecting not some higher world, but the world in which we are truly grounded and in which our existence truly becomes?
+ It is something I am very dubious of, for the capitalisation alone seems to imply some independent existence, an entity, rather than a commonality of conception and language use.
References
Melling, David, Understanding Plato, Oxford University Press, New York, 1987
Solomon, Robert, Introducing Philosophy, Oxford University Press, New York, 2005
© Alan Bowden, 2005
Thursday, February 23, 2006
The Samarra al-Askari Shrine
The bomb attack on the Shia Shrine on Wednesday morning has resulted in a pouring out of anger across Iraq. More than 100 have been killed (BBC News) in attacks on Sunni mosques, residences and citizens; including a prominent reporter who had gone to cover the attack this morning. The spectre of full-blown civil war now looms large in the country, with Iraqi politicians in crisis talks.
So, why should such an attack cause such anger, and why should it occur at all?
A mosque or a shrine is not simply a building. For many, it is the embodiment of a group identity, of a way of life, of belief. To attack such an embodiment is to attack the group. The al-Askari shrine is one such place, sacred to Shia Islam as the burial place of Imam al-Askari over one thousand years ago. The bombers knew this all too well. This bombing has caused greater loss of life, more protest, than any direct attack on an individual or group of individuals in the past. Extremism in Iraq is pushing for a welling up of fury, hate, and murder; and it is succeeding. One only has to look at the events of the past two days to see that. If events continue to spiral this may very well turn out to be the breaking of the Iraqi Government. Sunni politicians have already suspended coalition talks in protest at reprisals against their mosques and people. Dialogue is essential at times such as these. Shia and Sunni must work together to hold Iraq where it is now. Only then can the country move forward. Yet with extremists knowing all the right buttons to push, all the right targets to attack, it will take a monumental effort of co-operation to thwart the cause of the insurgency. An effort I'm not entirely sure they are, at this time and in this situation, capable of.
A stable future seems far off indeed.
So, why should such an attack cause such anger, and why should it occur at all?
A mosque or a shrine is not simply a building. For many, it is the embodiment of a group identity, of a way of life, of belief. To attack such an embodiment is to attack the group. The al-Askari shrine is one such place, sacred to Shia Islam as the burial place of Imam al-Askari over one thousand years ago. The bombers knew this all too well. This bombing has caused greater loss of life, more protest, than any direct attack on an individual or group of individuals in the past. Extremism in Iraq is pushing for a welling up of fury, hate, and murder; and it is succeeding. One only has to look at the events of the past two days to see that. If events continue to spiral this may very well turn out to be the breaking of the Iraqi Government. Sunni politicians have already suspended coalition talks in protest at reprisals against their mosques and people. Dialogue is essential at times such as these. Shia and Sunni must work together to hold Iraq where it is now. Only then can the country move forward. Yet with extremists knowing all the right buttons to push, all the right targets to attack, it will take a monumental effort of co-operation to thwart the cause of the insurgency. An effort I'm not entirely sure they are, at this time and in this situation, capable of.
A stable future seems far off indeed.
De Rerum Studentura
As an insight into student (well, my student) life I'll tell you that I've only just got up. At 3 o'clock in the afternoon, after having been awake for approximately twenty-seven hours.
I have my reasons.....
I have my reasons.....
Wednesday, February 22, 2006
Why we do philosophy...
How and why do we live our lives? In what way do we relate to those around us, the world we live in, the cosmos of which we are part? Do we believe in a 'God', 'Truth', 'science', ourselves, or perhaps nirvana? The context in which we make decisions, the basis of our beliefs about that context and so on. All this is what one might call philosophy.
Since prehistory man has considered his place in the world. For many thousands of years, until the advent of the Copernican heliocentric solar system, humanity believed itself to be at the centre of the universe. More often than not, this anthropocentrism was based upon religious writings of one sort or another, Genesis, perhaps, or the Koran. Both as individuals and as 'humanity', we think of everything as it relates to us, at the centre of our 'bubble'. Modern cosmology, however, has changed this picture more than anyone can have imagined. The universe is expanding. Even better, it is expanding at an ever-increasing rate. Oh, and another thing: It's bloody massive, immense beyond all the powers of conception of our tiny imaginations. Cosmic scales put anthropocentrism to shame. We are not, when it comes down to it, very important. Earth orbits an average star, in a pretty average galaxy, which is only one of billions in the known universe. So, now that I've thoroughly depressed everyone, we can move to building our self-esteem back up.
You can think, cogitate, meditate, rationalise, plan, reflect, argue and more. No species but us (that we know of) can do these things, not to the incredible extent that you can. And with this incredible ability comes philosophy. Not just philosophy, but every other endevour in human history. Yet I would argue that these are subsets, results, of the core pursuit of human thought. 'Obvious!' you might say. But this core pursuit is philosophy. Everything we do is based upon our beliefs: about our relations to other 'individuals', to ethics, values, the environment, government, religion, science, and truth. Philosophy as a discipline is concerned with sorting out all this crap that we carry around and trying to say something meaningful about it. Not only this, but this discipline tries to suggest ways in which we might live better lives, based, perhaps, upon some principle, some measure of truth, justice, interpersonal relations, mind, consciousness, value or whatnot. We all operate on such principles, most of the time unconsciously. Thus are we all philosophers, even if we don't know it. The man deciding whether or not to give up smoking is truly reflecting on the relative values of life and pleasure; the woman learning a language is discovering a new mode of perception and expression; the boy who drops rubbish is expressing an attitude towards the environment; and the scientist in the laboratory is endeavouring to discover, to move closer to, the nature or reality. They are all philosophers.
With no dusty books in sight.
© Alan Bowden 2006
Since prehistory man has considered his place in the world. For many thousands of years, until the advent of the Copernican heliocentric solar system, humanity believed itself to be at the centre of the universe. More often than not, this anthropocentrism was based upon religious writings of one sort or another, Genesis, perhaps, or the Koran. Both as individuals and as 'humanity', we think of everything as it relates to us, at the centre of our 'bubble'. Modern cosmology, however, has changed this picture more than anyone can have imagined. The universe is expanding. Even better, it is expanding at an ever-increasing rate. Oh, and another thing: It's bloody massive, immense beyond all the powers of conception of our tiny imaginations. Cosmic scales put anthropocentrism to shame. We are not, when it comes down to it, very important. Earth orbits an average star, in a pretty average galaxy, which is only one of billions in the known universe. So, now that I've thoroughly depressed everyone, we can move to building our self-esteem back up.
You can think, cogitate, meditate, rationalise, plan, reflect, argue and more. No species but us (that we know of) can do these things, not to the incredible extent that you can. And with this incredible ability comes philosophy. Not just philosophy, but every other endevour in human history. Yet I would argue that these are subsets, results, of the core pursuit of human thought. 'Obvious!' you might say. But this core pursuit is philosophy. Everything we do is based upon our beliefs: about our relations to other 'individuals', to ethics, values, the environment, government, religion, science, and truth. Philosophy as a discipline is concerned with sorting out all this crap that we carry around and trying to say something meaningful about it. Not only this, but this discipline tries to suggest ways in which we might live better lives, based, perhaps, upon some principle, some measure of truth, justice, interpersonal relations, mind, consciousness, value or whatnot. We all operate on such principles, most of the time unconsciously. Thus are we all philosophers, even if we don't know it. The man deciding whether or not to give up smoking is truly reflecting on the relative values of life and pleasure; the woman learning a language is discovering a new mode of perception and expression; the boy who drops rubbish is expressing an attitude towards the environment; and the scientist in the laboratory is endeavouring to discover, to move closer to, the nature or reality. They are all philosophers.
With no dusty books in sight.
© Alan Bowden 2006
Peace
My mother and I wrote this a few years ago for a commemoration service. It seems especially relevant at times such as these, when Muhammad cartoon protests are spiralling and we hear of new suicide attacks in Iraq every day. I am not personally a Christian any more, but the sentiment remains:
Lord, with the media focusing on the many conflicts overseas please help us not to forget the needs of our own country here at home. Bring understanding and acceptance where there is prejudice and hatred; and grant us a vision of our land as your love would make it.
We pray for our government and its leaders, that you would give them wisdom and compassion in all their decisions. We pray for everyone who takes decisions that affect the lives of others: for judges, doctors, teachers, social workers and civil servants. We ask for them, for ourselves and for all your people that you would help each one of us to understand the needs of others and try to do what is right for those around us so that together we may build a land where justice reigns, where the weak are protected, and where there is no more hunger or poverty:
a land where the benefits of civilised life are shared, for all to enjoy;
a land where different races and cultures live in tolerance and mutual respect:
A land where peace is built with justice, and justice is guided by love.
Please give us the inspiration and courage to work for this land and for your kingdom, for the sake of your Son, our Lord Jesus Christ.
Amen.
Lord, with the media focusing on the many conflicts overseas please help us not to forget the needs of our own country here at home. Bring understanding and acceptance where there is prejudice and hatred; and grant us a vision of our land as your love would make it.
We pray for our government and its leaders, that you would give them wisdom and compassion in all their decisions. We pray for everyone who takes decisions that affect the lives of others: for judges, doctors, teachers, social workers and civil servants. We ask for them, for ourselves and for all your people that you would help each one of us to understand the needs of others and try to do what is right for those around us so that together we may build a land where justice reigns, where the weak are protected, and where there is no more hunger or poverty:
a land where the benefits of civilised life are shared, for all to enjoy;
a land where different races and cultures live in tolerance and mutual respect:
A land where peace is built with justice, and justice is guided by love.
Please give us the inspiration and courage to work for this land and for your kingdom, for the sake of your Son, our Lord Jesus Christ.
Amen.
© Alan Bowden and Mary Bowden, 2006
Introductions
First things first. I make no guarantees whatsoever as to the content of this little blog...All issues, be they topical, philosophical, personal, theological, sporting, and even boring are fair game.
To save you the trouble of reading my profile (and, indeed, because I haven't worked out quite how to fill it in yet...) I'll give a quick rundown of who I am etc:
- Alan Bowden
- Philosophy & Theology student at the University of Durham, England.
- 19 (birthday 12th May '86. Feel free to send me a present.)
- Born and raised in South East London. No, I am not a cockney.
- Interests: Philosophy, theology, literature, history, politics, music (jazz, classical, rock, rap, hip-hop etc. Everything), sport (mainly Fives...no you won't have heard of it: http://www.rfa.org.uk), drama, singing. Anything I can give a go once.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
